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Abstract—The capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel model
is analyzed when there are multiple antennas at the sender,
intended receiver and eavesdropper. The associated channel
matrices are fixed and known to all the terminals. A computable
characterization of the secrecy capacity is established as the
saddle point solution to a minimax problem. The converse is
based on a Sato-type argument used in other broadcast settings,
and the coding theorem is based on Gaussian wiretap codebooks.
At high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), the secrecy capacity is
shown to be attained by simultaneously diagonalizing the channel
matrices via the generalized singular value decomposition, and
independently coding across the resulting parallel channels.
The associated capacity is expressed in terms of the corre-
sponding generalized singular values. It is shown that a semi-
blind “masked” multi-input multi-output (MIMO) transmission
strategy that sends information along directions in which there is
gain to the intended receiver, and synthetic noise along directions
in which there is not, can be arbitrarily far from capacity in this
regime.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the secrecy capacity to
be zero are provided, which simplify in the limit of many antennas
when the entries of the channel matrices are independent and
identically distributed. The resulting scaling laws establish that to
prevent secure communication, the eavesdropper needs 3 times as
many antennas as the sender and intended receiver have jointly,
and that the optimimum division of antennas between sender
and intended receiver is in the ratio of 2 : 1.
Index Terms—MIMO wiretap channel, secrecy capacity, cryp-
tography, multiple antennas, broadcast channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
MULTIPLE antennas are a valuable resource in wirelesscommunication. Over the last several years, there there
has been extensive activity in exploring the design, analysis,
and implementation of wireless systems with multiple an-
tennas, emphasizing their role in improving robustness and
throughput. In this work, we develop aspects of the emerging
role of multiple antennas in providing communication security
at the physical layer.
The wiretap channel [1] is an information-theoretic model
for physical-layer security. In the model, there are three
terminals—a sender, an intended receiver, and an eavesdrop-
per. The goal is to exploit the structure of the underlying
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broadcast channel to transmit a message reliably to the in-
tended receiver, while leaking asymptotically no information
to the eavesdropper. A single-letter characterization of the
secrecy capacity when the underlying broadcast channel is
discrete and memoryless is developed in [2]. An explicit
solution for the scalar Gaussian case is obtained in [3], where
the optimality of Gaussian codebooks is established.
In this paper, we consider the case where there are multiple
antennas at each of the three terminals, referring to it as
the multi-input, multi-output, multi-eavesdropper (MIMOME)
channel. In our model, the channel matrices are fixed and
known to all three terminals. While the eavesdropper’s channel
being known to both the sender and the receiver in the problem
formulation is a strong assumption, we remark in advance that
the solution provides ultimate limits on secure transmission
with multiple antennas, and thus serves as a starting point
for other formulations. Further discussion of the modeling
assumptions is provided in the companion paper [4] and the
compound extension has been recently treated in [5].
The problem of evaluating the secrecy capacity of channels
with multiple antennas has attracted increasing attention in
recent years. As a starting point, for Gaussian models in which
the channel matrices of intended receiver and eavesdropper
are square and diagonal, the results in [6]–[9], which consider
secure transmission over fading channels, can be applied. In
particular, for this special case of independent parallel Gaus-
sian subchannels, it follows that using independent Gaussian
wiretap codebooks across the subchannels achieves capacity.
More generally, the MIMOME channel is a nondegraded
broadcast channel to which the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner capacity ex-
pression [2] applies in principle. However, computing the
capacity directly from [2] appears difficult, as observed in,
e.g., [10]–[13].
To the best of our knowledge, the first computable upper
bound for the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian multi-antenna
wiretap channel appears in [4], [14], which is used to establish
the secrecy capacity in the special (MISOME) case that the
intended receiver has a single antenna. This approach involves
revealing the output of the eavesdropper’s channel to the
legitimate receiver to create a fictitious degraded broadcast
channel, and results in a minimax expression for the upper
bound, analogous to the technique of Sato [15] used to
upper bound the sum-capacity of the multi-antenna broadcast
channel; see, e.g., [16].
In [4], [14], this minimax upper bound is used to obtain
a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity in the
MISOME case. In addition, a number of insights are developed
into the behavior of the secrecy capacity. In the high signal-
2to-noise ratio (SNR) regime, the simple masked beamforming
scheme developed in [11] is shown to be near optimal. Also,
the scaling behavior of the secrecy capacity in the limit of
many antennas is studied.
We note that this upper bounding approach has been inde-
pendently conceived by Ulukus et al. [17] and further applied
to the case of two transmit antennas, two receive antennas,
and a single eavesdropper antenna [18]. Subsequently, this
minimax upper bound was shown to be tight for the MIMOME
case in [19] and, independently, [20] (see also [21]). Both
treatments start from the minimax upper bound of [4] and
work with the optimality conditions to establish that the saddle
value is achievable with the standard Gaussian wiretap code
construction [2].
In some of the most recent work, [22] provides an alterna-
tive derivation of the MIMOME secrecy capacity using an ap-
proach based on channel-enhancement techniques introduced
in [23]. The two approaches shed complementary insights into
the problem. The minimax upper bounding approach in [19],
[20] provides a computable characterization for the capacity
expression and identifies a hidden convexity in optimizing the
Csisza´r-Ko¨rner expression with Gaussian inputs, whereas the
channel enhancement approach does not. On the other hand the
latter approach establishes the capacity given any covariance
constraint on the input distribution, not just the sum-power
constraint to which the minimax upper bounding approach has
been limited.
Finally, the diversity-multiplexing tradeoff of the multi-
antenna wiretap channel has been recently studied in [24].
An outline of the paper is as follows. Section II summa-
rizes some notational conventions for the paper. Section III
describes the basic channel and system model, as well as
a canonical decomposition of the channel in terms of its
generalized singular values, which is used in some of the
asymptotic analysis. Section IV summarizes the main results
of the paper, and Sections V–VII provide the correspond-
ing analysis. In particular, Section V develops the minimax
characterization of the secrecy capacity, Section VI develops
the high SNR analysis in terms of the generalized singular
values, and Section VII develops the conditions under which
the secrecy capacity is zero in the limit of many antennas.
Finally, Section VIII contains some concluding remarks.
II. NOTATION
In terms of fonts, bold upper and lower case characters are
used for matrices and vectors, respectively. Random variables
are distinguished from their realizations by the use of san-
serif fonts for the former and regular serifed fonts for the
latter. Sets are denoted using caligraphic fonts. We gener-
ally reserve the symbols I(·) for mutual information, and
h(·) for differential entropy, and all logarithms are base-2
unless otherwise indicated. In addition, CN(0,K) denotes a
circularly-symmetrix complex-valued Gaussian random vector
with covariance matrix K.
The set of all n-dimensional complex-valued vectors is
denoted by Cn, and the set of m × n-dimensional matrices
is denoted using Cm×n. In addition, I denotes the identity
matrix and 0 denotes the zero matrix. When the dimensions
of these matrices is not clear from context, we will explicily
indicate their size via subscripts; e.g., 0n×m denotes an n×m
zero matrix, 0n denotes a vector of zeros of length n, and
In denotes an n × n identity matrix. We further use the
notation [·]i:j for j ≥ i to denote the subvector of its vector
argument corresponding to indices i, i + 1, . . . , j. Likewise,
[·]i:j,k:l denotes the submatrix formed from rows i through j
and columns k through l of its matrix argument.
Matrix transposition is denoted using the superscript T, the
Hermitian (i.e., conjugate) transpose of a matrix is denoted
using the superscript †, the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse
is denoted by ‡, and the projection matrix onto the null
space is denoted by ♯. In addition, Null(·), rank(·), and
σmax(·) denote the null space, rank, and largest singular value,
respectively, of their matrix arguments. Moreover, we say
a matrix has full column-rank if its rank is equal to the
number of columns, and the notation A ≻ 0 means that A
is positive definite, with A  0 likewise denoting positive
semidefiniteness.
In other notation, dim(·) denotes the dimension of its
subspace argument, span(·) denotes the subspace spanned by
the collection of vectors that are its argument, ⊥ denotes
the orthogonal complement of a subspace. Moreover, ‖ · ‖
denotes the usual Euclidean norm of a vector argument, tr(·)
and det(·) denote the trace and determinant of a matrix,
respectively, and diag(·) denotes a diagonal matrix whose
diagonal elements are given by its argument.
Finally, we use a.s.= and a.s.−→ to denote almost-sure equality
and convergence, respectively, and additionally use standard
order notation. Specifically, O(ǫ) and o(ǫ) denote terms such
that O(ǫ)/ǫ < ∞ and o(ǫ)/ǫ → 0, respectively, in the
associated limit, so that, e.g., o(1) represents a vanishing term.
III. CHANNEL AND SYSTEM MODEL
Using nt, nr, and ne to denote the number of antennas at
the sender, intended receiver, and eavesdropper, respectively,
the received signals at the intended receiver and eavesdropper
in the channel model of interest are, respectively,
yr(t) = Hrx(t) + zr(t)
ye(t) = Hex(t) + ze(t)
, t = 1, 2, . . . , n, (1)
where x(t) is the transmitted signal, where Hr ∈ Cnr×nt and
He ∈ Cne×nt are complex channel gain matrices, and where
zr(t) and ze(t) are each independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) noises whose samples are CN(0, I) random variables.
The channel matrices are constant (over the transmission
interval) and known to all the three terminals. Moreover, the
channel input satisfies the power constraint
E
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
‖x(t)‖2
]
≤ P.
A rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of length
n codes such that both the error probability at the intended
receiver and I(w ; yne )/n approach zero as n → ∞. The
secrecy capacity is the supremum of all achievable rates.
3A. Channel Decomposition
For some of our analysis, it will be convenient to exploit the
generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD) [25], [26]
of the channel (1). To develop this decomposition, we first
define the subspaces
Sr = Null(Hr)
⊥ ∩ Null(He) (2a)
Sr,e = Null(Hr)
⊥ ∩ Null(He)⊥ (2b)
Se = Null(Hr) ∩ Null(He)⊥ (2c)
Sn = Null(Hr) ∩ Null(He), (2d)
corresponding to classes of inputs that have nonzero gain to,
respectively, the intended receiver only, both intended receiver
and eavesdropper, the eavesdropper only, and neither. Letting
k , rank(H) (3)
with
H =
[
Hr
He
]
, (4)
it follows that dim(Sn) = nt − k. Moreover, we use the
notation
p , dim(Sr) and s , dim(Sr,e), (5)
from which it follows that dim(Se) = k − p− s.
Using this notation, our channel decomposition is as fol-
lows.
Definition 1: The GSVD of (Hr,He) takes the form
Hr = ΨrΣr
[
Ω−1 0k×(nt−k)
]
Ψ
†
t (6a)
He = ΨeΣe
[
Ω−1 0k×(nt−k)
]
Ψ
†
t , (6b)
where Ψr ∈ Cnr×nr , Ψe ∈ Cne×ne and Ψt ∈ Cnt×nt are
unitary, where Ω ∈ Ck×k is lower triangular and nonsingular,
and where
Σr =


k−p−s s p
nr−p−s 0 0 0
s 0 Dr 0
p 0 0 I

 (7a)
Σe =


k−p−s s p
k−p−s I 0 0
s 0 De 0
ne+p−k 0 0 0

, (7b)
are diagonal with
Dr = diag(r1, . . . , rs), De = diag(e1, . . . , es), (8)
the diagonal entries of which are real and strictly positive. The
associated generalized singular values are
σi ,
ri
ei
, i = 1, 2, . . . , s. (9)
For convenience, we choose the (otherwise arbitrary) indexing
so that σ1 ≤ σ2 ≤ · · · ≤ σs.
IV. SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS
In this section we summarize the main results in this paper.
The analysis is provided in Sections V–VII.
A. MIMOME Secrecy Capacity
A characterization of the secrecy capacity of the MIMOME
channel is as follows.
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity of the MIMOME wiretap
channel (1) is
C = min
KΦ∈KΦ
max
KP∈KP
R+(KP ,KΦ), (10)
where
R+(KP ,KΦ) = I(x; yr|ye), (11)
with x ∼ CN(0,KP ) and
KP ,
{
KP : KP  0, tr(KP ) ≤ P
}
, (12)
and where
z ,
[
zr
ze
]
∼ CN(0,KΦ), (13)
with1
KΦ ,
{
KΦ : KΦ =
[
Inr Φ
Φ† Ine
]
, KΦ  0
}
. (14)
Furthermore, the minimax problem of (10) is convex-concave
with saddle point solution (K¯P , K¯Φ), via which the secrecy
capacity can be expressed in the form
C = R−(K¯P ) , log
det(I+HrK¯PH
†
r)
det(I+HeK¯PH
†
e)
. (15)
Finally, C = 0 if and only if
Hr = Θ¯He, (16)
where
Θ¯ , Θ(K¯P ), Θ(KP ) , Θ(KP , K¯Φ), (17)
with
Θ(KP ,KΦ) , (HrKPH
†
e +Φ)(I +HeKPH
†
e)
−1 (18)
denoting the coefficient in the linear minimum mean-square
error (MMSE) estimate of yr from ye,
Several remarks are worthwhile. First, our result can be
related to the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner characterization of the secrecy
capacity for a nondegraded discrete memoryless broadcast
channel pyr,ye|x in the form [2]
C = max
pu ,px|u
I(u; yr)− I(u; ye), (19)
where u is an auxiliary random variable (over some alphabet
with bounded cardinality) that satisfies the Markov constraint
u ↔ x ↔ (yr, ye). As [2] remarks, the secrecy capacity
(19) can be extended to incorporate continuous-valued inputs
of the type of interest in the present paper. With such an
extension, Theorem 1, and in particular (15), can be interpreted
as (indirectly) establishing a suitable Gaussian wiretap code
for achieving capacity.2 Specifically, via the chain rule,
I(x; yr|ye) =
[
I(x; yr)− I(x; ye)
]
+ I(x; ye|yr)
1The constraint KΦ  0 is equivalently expressed as the requirement that
σmax(Φ) ≤ 1, as we will exploit.
2Each candidate (u, x) in (19) corresponds to a particular coding scheme
based on binning, which we generically refer as a “wiretap code,” which
achieves rate I(u; yr)− I(u; ye).
4where the last term on the right-hand side is zero when Φ =
Φ¯, and thus we have the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 1: The secrecy capacity of the MIMOME wire-
tap channel is achieved by a wiretap coding scheme in which
u ∼ CN(0,KP ) with KP = K¯P , and x = u.
From this perspective, our result can also be interpreted as
a convex reformulation of the nonconvex optimization (19).
Indeed, even after knowing that both an optimizing u is
Gaussian and x = u is sufficient—which itself is nontrivial—
determining the optimal covariance via
K¯P ∈ argmax
KP∈KP
log
det(I+HrKPH
†
r)
det(I+HeKPH
†
e)
(20)
with KP as defined in (12), is a nonconvex problem.3 And
even if one verifies that K¯P satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions associated with (20), these necessary
conditions only establish local optimality, i.e., that K¯P is
a stationary point of the associated objective function. By
contrast, (10) establishes that the (global) solution to (20)
is obtained as the solution to a convex problem, as well as
establishing the optimality of a Gaussian input distribution.
Second, additional insights are obtained from the structure
of the saddle point solution (K¯P , K¯Φ). In particular, using Φ¯
to denote the optimal cross-covariance, i.e., [cf. (14)]
K¯Φ , KΦ¯ =
[
Inr Φ¯
Φ¯† Ine
]
, (21)
we establish in the course of our development of Theorem 1
the following key property.
Property 1: The saddle point solution (K¯P , K¯Φ) to the
MIMOME wiretap channel capacity (10) satisfies
Φ¯†HrS¯ = HeS¯, ∀ full column-rank S¯ s.t. S¯S¯† = K¯P , (22)
provided Hr 6= Θ¯He (i.e., provided C 6= 0).
It follows from (22) that the effective channel to the eaves-
dropper is a degraded version of that to the intended receiver.
Indeed, the intended receiver can simulate the eavesdropper
channel by adding noise. Specifically, it generates
y′e = Φ¯
†yr +w,
where the added noise w ∼ CN(0, I − Φ¯†Φ¯) is independent
of yr, so, using (1), (22), and the notation x = S¯x′ with x′ ∼
CN(0, I), we have
y′e = Φ¯
†HrS¯x′ + Φ¯†zr +w = HeS¯x′ + z′e = Hex+ z
′
e,
where z′e ∼ CN(0, I). In essence, the optimal signal design for
transmission is such that no information is transmitted along
any direction where the eavesdropper observes a stronger
signal than the legitimate receiver. A key consequence is
that a genie-aided system in which ye is provided to the
receiver, which would otherwise provide only an upper bound
3Note that in the high-SNR regime, (20) reduces to
max
K∈K∞
log
det(HrKH
†
r )
det(HeKH
†
e)
,
which is the well-studied multiple-discriminant function in multivariate statis-
tics; see, e.g., [27].
on capacity in general, does not increase the capacity of the
channel in this case, a feature that is ultimately central to our
analysis.
Finally, the condition (16) corresponding to when the se-
crecy capacity is zero has a natural physical interpretation. In
particular, under this condition, the effective channel to the
intended receiver is a degraded version of that to the eaves-
dropper. Indeed, the eavesdropper can simulate the intended
receiver by adding noise. Specifically, it generates
y′r = Θ¯ye +w,
where the added noise w ∼ CN(0, I − Φ¯Φ¯†) is independent
of yr, so, using (1) we have
y′r = Θ¯Hex+ Θ¯zr +w = Hrx+ z
′
r,
where z′r ∼ CN(0, I) since
Θ¯ = Φ¯ if Hr = Θ¯He, (23)
which follows from (17) with (18).
B. Secrecy Capacity in the High-SNR Regime
In the high-SNR limit (i.e., P → ∞), the secrecy capacity
(10) is naturally described in terms of the GSVD of the channel
(1) as defined in (6). The GSVD simultaneously diagonalizes
the Hr and He, yielding an equivalent parallel channel model
for the problem. As such, a capacity-approaching scheme in
the high-SNR regime involves using for transmission (with a
wiretap code) only those subchannels for which the gain to
the intended receiver is larger, and the following convenient
expression for the capacity (10) results.
Theorem 2: Let σ1 ≤ σ2 ≤ . . . ≤ σs be the generalized
singular values of (Hr,He). Then as P → ∞, the secrecy
capacity of the MIMOME wiretap channel (1) takes the
asymptotic form
C(P ) = C0(P ) +
∑
j :σj≥1
log σ2j − o(1), (24)
where
C0(P ) =

log det
(
I+
P
p
HrH
♯
eH
†
r
)
, rank(He) < nt,
0, rank(He) = nt,
(25)
with p and s as given in (5), and with H♯e denoting the
projection matrix onto Null(He).
Note that a simple and intuitive transmission scheme for
the MIMOME channel would involve simultaneously and
isotropically transmitting information in Null(Hr)⊥, where
there is gain to the intended receiver, and (synthetic) noise
in Null(Hr), which does not affect the intended receiver but
does reduce the quality of the eavesdroppers received signal.4
This “masked” multi-input, multi-output (MIMO) transmission
scheme is the natural generalization of the masked beamform-
ing proposed in [11] for the MISOME wiretap channel. For the
MISOME channel, such an approach is near optimal, as shown
4Note that the scheme is semi-blind: the transmitter does not need to know
He to construct the required subspaces, but does need to know He in order
to choose the communication rate.
5in [4]. However, we now show that such a masked multi-input
multi-output (MIMO) scheme can be quite far from optimal
on the MIMOME channel.
For convenience, we restrict our attention to the case in
which nr ≤ nt ≤ ne and Hr and He are full rank—i.e.,
rank(Hr) = nr and rank(He) = nt—and thus k = nt, p = 0,
and s = nr in the GSVD.
The masked MIMO scheme is naturally viewed as a wiretap
coding scheme in which a particular (rather than optimal)
choice for (x, u) is imposed in (19). In particular, first we
choose u to correspond to (information-bearing) codewords in
a randomly generated codebook, i.e.,
u = (b1, . . . , bnr), (26a)
where the elements are generated in an i.i.d. manner according
to CN(0, Pt) with
Pt ,
P
nt
. (26b)
Additionally, we let bnr+1, . . . , bnt be randomly generated
(synthetic) noise, i.e., independent CN(0, Pt) random vari-
ables.
Next, we choose the transmission x according to
x =
nt∑
j=1
bjvj , (26c)
where the vectors v1, . . . ,vnt are chosen as follows. Let
Hr = U∆V
†
r (27)
be the compact singular value decomposition (SVD) of Hr.
Since rank(Hr) = nr, this means thatU is nr×nr and unitary,
∆ is nr × nr and diagonal with positive diagonal elements,
and Vr is nt × nr with orthogonal columns. Then we choose
v1, . . . ,vnr in (26c) as the columns of Vr, i.e.,
Vr =
[
v1 v2 · · · vnr
]
,
and (freely) choose
Vn ,
[
vnr+1 · · · vnt
]
, (28)
a basis for the null space of Hr, so that
[
Vr Vn
]
is unitary.
As we will establish, substituting these parameters in the
argument of (19) yields the achievable rate
RSN(P ) = log det
[(
PtI+∆
−2)(Hr(I+ PtH†eHe)−1H†r)] ,
(29)
which in the high-SNR regime reduces to
lim
P→∞
RSN(P ) = log det
(
Hr(H
†
eHe)
−1H†r
)
=
nr∑
j=1
log σ2j ,
(30)
where the second equality comes from expanding Hr and He
via (6), with σ1, σ2, . . . denoting the generalized singular val-
ues (9). Comparing (30) and (24), we see that the asymptotic
gap to capacity is
lim
P→∞
[
C(P )−RSN(P )
]
=
∑
j :σj<1
log
1
σ2j
,
which, evidently, can be arbitrarily large when there are small
singular values.
In concluding this section, we emphasize that only in
the high-SNR regime do the generalized singular values of
(Hr,He) completely characterize the capacity-achieving and
masked MIMO coding schemes.
C. MIMOME Channel Scaling Laws
By using sufficiently many antennas, the eavesdropper can
drive to secrecy capacity to zero. In such a regime, the
eavesdropper would be able to decode a nonvanishing fraction
of any sent message—even when the sender and receiver
fully exploit knowledge of He. In general, this threshold
depends on the numbers of antennas at the transmitter and
intended receiver, as well as on the particular channels to
intended receiver and eavesdropper. One characterization of
this threshold is given by (16) in Theorem 1. An equivalent
characterization that is more useful in the development of
scaling laws, is as follows.
Claim 1: The secrecy capacity of the MIMOME channel is
zero if and only if
σmax(Hr,He) , sup
v∈Cnt
‖Hrv‖
‖Hev‖ ≤ 1. (31)
where σmax(Hr,He) denotes the channel’s largest generalized
singular value.
When the coefficients of the channels are drawn at random,
and the numbers of antennas are large, the threshold becomes
independent of the channel realization. The following result
characterizes this scaling behavior.
Corollary 2: Suppose that Hr and He have i.i.d. CN(0, 1)
entries that are fixed for the entire period of transmission, and
known to all the terminals. Then when nr, ne, nt → ∞ such
that γ , nr/ne and β , nt/ne are fixed constants, the secrecy
capacity satisfies C(Hr,He)
a.s.−→ 0 if and only if
0 ≤ β ≤ 1
2
and γ ≤ (1−
√
2β)2. (32)
Fig. 1 depicts the zero-capacity region (32). In this plot,
the solid curve describes the relative number of antennas an
eavesdropper needs to prevent secure communication, as a
function of the antenna resources available at the transmitter
and intended receiver. The related scaling law developed for
the MISOME case [4] corresponds to the vertical intercept of
this plot: C a.s.−→ 0 when β ≤ 1/2, i.e., when the eavesdropper
has at least twice the number of antennas as the sender.
Note, too, that the single transmit antenna (SIMOME) case
corresponds to the horizontal intercept; in this case we see
that C a.s.−→ 0 when γ ≤ 1, i.e., when the eavesdropper has
more antennas than the intended receiver.
We can further use such scaling analysis to determine
the best asymptotic allocation of a (large) fixed number of
antennas T between transmitter and intended receiver in the
presence of an an eavesdropper. In particular, the optimum
allocation is
(β∗, γ∗) = argmin{
(β,γ) : 0≤β≤1/2,
0≤γ≤(1−√2β)2
}
(β + γ) =
(
2
9
,
1
9
)
, (33)
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Fig. 1. The efficient frontier of secure communication region as a function of
the number of antennas at the transmitter and intended receiver (relative to
the number at the eavesdropper), in the limit of many antennas. The capacity
is zero for any point below the curve, i.e., whenever the eavesdropper has
sufficiently many antennas.
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Fig. 2. The minimum (relative) number of eavesdropper antennas required
to drive the secrecy capacity to zero, as a function of the antenna allocation
between transmitter and intended receiver, in the limit of many antennas.
as is easily verified. Thus, the allocation that best thwarts the
eavesdropper is nr/nt = 1/2, which requires the eavesdropper
to use 3T antennas to prevent secure communication.
It is worth remarking that the objective function in (33)
is rather insensitive to deviations from the optimal antenna
allocation, as Fig. 2 demonstrates. If fact, even if we were
to allocate equal numbers of antennas to the sender and the
receiver, the eavesdropper would still need (3/2 +
√
2)T ≈
2.9142T antennas to drive the secrecy capacity to zero.
V. MIMOME SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS
In this section we prove Theorem 1. Our proof involves two
main parts. We first recognize the right-hand side of (10) as an
upper bound on the secrecy capacity, then exploit properties
PSfrag replacements
Saddle Point: (K¯P , K¯Φ)
K¯Φ ∈ argmin
KΦ
R+(K¯P ,KΦ)
K¯P ∈ argmax
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R+(KP , K¯Φ)
K¯P ∈ argmax
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h(yr − Θ¯ye)
Φ¯
†
HrS¯ = HeS¯⇒ R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) = R−(K¯P )
Fig. 3. Key steps in the proof of Theorem 1. First, the existence of a saddle
point (K¯P , K¯Φ) is established, then the KKT conditions associated with the
minimax expressions are used to simplify the saddle value to show that it
matches the lower bound.
of the saddle point solution to establish
R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) = R−(K¯P ), (34)
where R−(K¯P ) is the lower bound (achievable rate) given in
(15).
We begin by stating our upper bound, which is a trivial
generalization of that established in [4].
Lemma 1 ( [4]): An upper bound on the secrecy capacity
of the MIMOME channel (1) is given by
C(P ) ≤ R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) = min
KΦ∈KΦ
max
KP∈KP
R+(KP ,KΦ),
(35)
where
R+(KP ,KΦ) , I(x; yr|ye), (36)
with x ∼ CN(0,KP ), and z ∼ CN(0,KΦ), and the domain
sets KP and KΦ are defined via (12) and (14) respectively.
It remains to establish that this upper bound expression
satisfies (34), which we do in the remainder of this section.
We divide the proof into several steps, as depicted in Fig. 3.
Furthermore, we remark in advance that the analysis
throughout is slightly simpler when KΦ ≻ 0. Accordingly, in
the following sections we focus on this nonsingular case and
defer analysis for the singular case to appendices as it arises
in our development. The key to analysis of the singular case
is replacing the observations yr with reduced but equivalent
observations. In particular, we will make use of the following
claim, a proof of which is provided in Appendix I.
Claim 2: Let the singular value decomposition of Φ be
expressed the form
Φ =
[
U1 U2
] [I 0
0 ∆
] [
V
†
1
V
†
2
]
, σmax(∆) < 1. (37)
Then if px is such that I(x; yr|ye) <∞, we have
I(x; yr|ye) = I(x; y˜r|ye), (38)
where
y˜r , U
†
2yr = H˜rx+ z˜r (39)
7with
H˜r , U
†
2Hr and z˜r , U
†
2zr. (40)
Symmetrically, if px is such that I(x; ye|yr) <∞, we have
I(x; ye|yr) = I(x; y˜e|yr), (41)
where
y˜e , V
†
2ye = H˜ex+ z˜e (42)
with
H˜e , V
†
2He and z˜e , V
†
2ze. (43)
Finally, for any px we have that I(x; yr|ye) = ∞ if and only
if
TKPT
† 6= 0, (44)
where KP is the covariance associated with px, and where
T , U
†
1Hr −V†1He. (45)
Note that when (38) holds, the equivalent model holds and
Φ˜ , E[z˜rz
†
e] = U
†
2Φ (46)
is the equivalent noise cross-covariance.
A. Existence of a Saddle Point Solution
We first show that the minimax upper bound is a convex-
concave problem with a (finite) saddle point solution.
Lemma 2: The upper bound (35) has a saddle point solu-
tion, i.e., there exists (K¯P , K¯Φ) ∈ KP ×KΦ such that
R+(KP , K¯Φ) ≤ R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) ≤ R+(K¯P ,KΦ) (47)
holds for each (KP ,KΦ) ∈ KP ×KΦ. Moreover, the saddle
value is finite, i.e.,
R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) <∞. (48)
Proof: Since the constraint sets KP and KΦ are convex
and compact, from a special case of Sion’s minimax theorem
[28] it suffices to show that
R+(KP , ·) is convex on KΦ for each KP ∈ KP (P1)
R+(·,KΦ) is concave on KP for each KΦ ∈ KΦ (P2)
To first establish (P1), we begin by writing
I(x; yr|ye) = I(x; yr, ye)− I(x; ye), (49)
and observe that the second term in (49) is fixed for each
KΦ ∈ KΦ. Thus it suffices to show that with x ∼ CN(0,KP ),
the first term in (49) is convex in KΦ. This is established in,
e.g., [29, Lemma II-3, p. 3076].
We next establish (P2). With slight abuse of notation, we
define R+(px,KΦ) = I(x; yr|ye) with x ∼ px and z ∼
CN(0,KΦ). By contrast, our original notation R+(Q,KΦ)
corresponds to the special case of R+(px,KΦ) in which
px = CN(0,Q). Let p0x = CN(0,Q0), p1x = CN(0,Q1),
pθx = θp
1
x + (1 − θ)p0x , and Qθ = (1 − θ)Q0 + θQ1, for
some θ ∈ [0, 1]. Then the required concavity follows from
R+(Q
θ,KΦ) = R+(CN(0,Q
θ),KΦ)
≥ R+(pθx ,KΦ) (50)
≥ (1− θ)R+(p0x ,KΦ) + θR+(p1x ,KΦ) (51)
= (1− θ)R+(Q0,KΦ) + θR+(Q1,KΦ),
where (50) follows from the fact that a Gaussian distribution
maximizes R+(pθx ,KΦ) among all distributions with a given
covariance, which we discuss below, and where (51) follows
from the fact that I(x; yr|ye) is concave in px for each fixed
pyr,ye|x; see, e.g., [8, Appendix I].
Verifying (50) is straightforward when KΦ is nonsingular,
i.e., ‖Φ‖2 < 1. Specifically, with
Λ(KP ,KΦ)
, I+HrKPH
†
r
− (Φ+HrKPH†e)(I+HeKPH†e)−1(Φ† +HeKPH†r)
(52)
denoting the error covariance associated with the linear MMSE
estimateΘ(KP ,KΦ)ye of yr from ye, a simple generalization
of [4, Lemma 2] yields
I(x; yr|ye) = h(yr|ye)− h(zr|ze) (53)
= h(yr|ye)− log detπe(I−ΦΦ†)
≤ log detΛ(KP ,KΦ)− log det(I−ΦΦ†),
(54)
where the last inequality is satisfied with equality if px =
CN(0,KP ). When KΦ is singular, (53) is not well-defined,
so some straightforward modifications to the approach are
required; these we detail in Appendix II.
Finally, to verify (48), it suffices to note that
R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) ≤ R+(K¯P , I) ≤ I(x; ye, yr) <∞
where the second inequality follows from the chain rule
I(x; yr|ye) = I(x; ye, yr) − I(x; ye), and where the last
inequality follows from the fact that cov(z) = I.
B. Property of the Saddle Point
To simplify evaluation of the associated saddle value, we
now develop the Property 1. For notational convenience, we
define Λ¯ via [cf. (52)]
Λ¯ , Λ(K¯P ), Λ(KP ) , Λ(KP , K¯Φ). (55)
The required property is obtained by combining the follow-
ing two lemmas.
Lemma 3: A saddle point solution (K¯P , K¯Φ) to (35) sat-
isfies
(Hr − Θ¯He)K¯P (Φ¯†Hr −He)† = 0 (56)
Lemma 4: A saddle point solution (K¯P , K¯Φ) to (35) is
such that
(Hr − Θ¯He)S¯ has a full column-rank (57)
8provided Hr 6= Θ¯He, where S¯ is a full column-rank matrix
such that S¯S¯† = K¯P .
In particular, combining (56) and (57) we immediately
obtain (22), since for a full column-rank matrix M, Ma = 0
if and only if a = 0.
In the remainder of the section, we prove the two lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 3: Here we consider the simpler case
when K¯Φ ≻ 0; the extension of the proof to the case when
K¯Φ is singular is provided in Appendix III.
We begin by noting that the second inequality in (47)
implies
K¯Φ ∈ argmin
KΦ∈KΦ
R+(K¯P ,KΦ). (58)
The Lagrangian associated with the minimization (58) is
LΦ(KΦ,Υ) = R+(K¯P ,KΦ) + tr(ΥKΦ), (59)
where the dual variable
Υ =
[ nr ne
nr Υ1 0
ne 0 Υ2
]
(60)
is a block diagonal matrix corresponding to the constraint that
the noise covariance KΦ must have identity matrices on its
diagonal. The associated KKT conditions yield
∇KΦLΦ(KΦ,Υ)
∣∣
KΦ=K¯Φ
= ∇KΦR+(K¯P ,KΦ)
∣∣
KΦ=K¯Φ
+Υ = 0. (61)
Substituting
∇KΦR+(K¯P ,KΦ)
∣∣
KΦ=K¯Φ
= ∇KΦ
[
log det(KΦ +HK¯PH
†)−log det(KΦ)
]∣∣
KΦ=K¯Φ
= (K¯Φ +HK¯PH
†)−1 − K¯−1Φ , (62)
with (4) into (61) and simplifying, we obtain,
HK¯PH
† = K¯ΦΥ(K¯Φ +HK¯PH†). (63)
To complete the proof requires a straightforward manipula-
tion of (63) to obtain (56). Specifically, substituting for K¯Φ
from (21) and H from (4) into (63), and carrying out the
associated block matrix multiplication yields
HrK¯PH
†
r = Υ1(I+HrK¯PH
†
r) + Φ¯Υ2(Φ¯
† +HeK¯PH†r)
(64)
HrK¯PH
†
e = Υ1(Φ¯+HrK¯PH
†
e) + Φ¯Υ2(I+HeK¯PH
†
e)
(65)
HeK¯PH
†
r = Φ¯
†Υ1(I+HrK¯PH†r) +Υ2(Φ¯
† +HeK¯PH†r)
(66)
HeK¯PH
†
e = Φ¯
†Υ1(Φ¯+HrK¯PH†e) +Υ2(I+HeK¯PH
†
e).
(67)
Eliminating Υ1 from (64) and (66), we obtain
(Φ¯†Hr−He)K¯PH†r = (Φ¯†Φ¯−I)Υ2(Φ¯†+HeK¯PH†r), (68)
and eliminating Υ1 from (65) and (67), we obtain
(Φ¯†Hr−He)K¯PH†e = (Φ¯†Φ¯− I)Υ2(I+HeK¯PH†e). (69)
Finally, eliminating Υ2 from (68) and (69), we obtain
(Φ¯†Hr −He)K¯PH†r
= (Φ¯†Hr −He)K¯PH†e(I+HeK¯PH†e)−1(Φ¯† +HeK¯PH†r)
= (Φ¯†Hr −He)K¯PH†eΘ¯†, (70)
which reduces to (56) as desired.
In preparation for proving Lemma 4, we establish the
following key proposition, whose proof is provided in Ap-
pendix IV.
Proposition 1: When x ∼ CN(0,KP ) and z ∼ CN(0, K¯Φ)
with K¯Φ ≻ 0 in the model (1), we have5
argmax
KP∈KP
h(yr −Θ(KP )ye) = argmax
KP∈KP
h(yr − Θ¯ye), (71)
where Θ¯ and Θ(KP ) are as defined in (17) with (18).
Proof of Lemma 4: Again, here we consider the simpler
case when K¯Φ is nonsingular; a proof for the case when K¯Φ
is singular is provided in Appendix V.
We begin by noting that
K¯P ∈ argmax
KP∈KP
R+(KP , K¯Φ) (72)
= argmax
KP∈KP
h(yr|ye) (73)
= argmax
KP∈KP
h(yr −Θ(KP )ye) (74)
= argmax
KP∈KP
h(yr − Θ¯ye) (75)
= argmax
KP∈KP
log det(I+ H¯effKP H¯
†
eff), (76)
where (72) follows from the first inequality in (47), where
(73) follows from the fact that K¯Φ ≻ 0, where (75) follows
from Proposition 1, and where in (76) we have the effective
channel6
H¯eff , J¯
−1/2(Hr − Θ¯He), (77a)
with
J¯ , I+ Θ¯Θ¯† − Θ¯Φ¯† − Φ¯Θ¯†
= (I− Φ¯Φ¯†) + (Θ¯− Φ¯)(Θ¯− Φ¯)†, (77b)
which is nonsingular since K¯Φ ≻ 0.
Finally, because J¯ ≻ 0, showing (57) is equivalent to
showing that that H¯eff S¯ has full column-rank, which we
establish in the sequel to conclude the proof. First, we express
H¯eff in terms of its singular value decomposition
H¯eff = AΣeffB
†, (78)
i.e., A and B are unitary matrices, and
Σeff =
[ ν nt−ν
ν Σ0 0
nr−ν 0 0
]
, (79)
where ν , rank(H¯eff) > 0 and Σ0 is diagonal with strictly
positive entries. We establish that H¯eff S¯ has full column-rank
5Note that the maximum on the left-hand side is in general a lower bound
on the maximum on the right-hand side.
6As an aside, note that (76) provides the interpretation of K¯P as an optimal
input covariance for a MIMO channel with matrix H¯eff and unit-variance
white Gaussian noise.
9by showing that the columns of S¯ are spanned by the first ν
columns of B, i.e.,
F¯ , B†K¯PB =
[ ν nt−ν
ν F¯0 0
nt−ν 0 0
]
(80)
for some F¯0  0.
To this end, substituting (78) into (76), we obtain
K¯P = argmax
KP∈KP
log det(I+AΣeffB
†KPBΣ
†
effA
†)
= argmax
KP∈KP
log det(I+ΣeffB
†KPBΣ
†
eff), . (81)
Now KP ∈ KP if and only if F = B†KPB ∈ KP , so (81)
implies that
F¯ ∈ argmax
F∈KP
log det(I+ΣeffFΣ
†
eff)
= argmax
F∈KP
log det(I+Σ0F0Σ
†
0), (82)
with F expressed in terms of the block notation
F =
[ ν nt−ν
ν F0 F1
nt−ν F†1 F2
]
, (83)
and where (82) follows from (79).
Finally, it follows that F¯1 and F¯2, the F1 and F2 in
(83) when F = F¯, are both 0. Indeed, if F¯2 6= 0, then
tr(F¯2) > 0. This would contradict the optimality in (82): since
the objective function only depends on F¯0, one could strictly
increase the objective function by increasing the trace of F¯0
and decreasing the trace of F¯2. Finally, since F¯  0 and
F¯2 = 0, it follows that F¯1 = 0.
C. Evaluation of the Saddle Value: Proof of Theorem 1
The conditions in Lemmas 3 and 4 can be used in turn to
establish the tightness of the upper bound (35).
Lemma 5: The saddle value R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) in (35) can be
expressed as
R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) =
{
R−(K¯P ), Hr 6= Θ¯He
0, otherwise,
(84)
where R−(K¯P ) is as given in (15).
The proof of Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of
Lemma 5. If R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) = 0, the capacity is zero, oth-
erwise R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) = R−(K¯P ), and the latter expression
is an achievable rate as can be seen by setting pu = px =
CN(0, K¯P ) in the argument of (19).
Thus, to conclude the section it remains only to prove our
lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5: Here we consider the case when
when K¯Φ ≻ 0, i.e., ‖Φ‖2 < 1; the proof for the case when
K¯Φ is singular is provided in Appendix VI.
To obtain (84) when Hr 6= Θ¯He, we begin by writing the
gap between upper and lower bounds as
R+(K¯P , K¯Φ)−R−(K¯P )
= I(x; yr|ye)− [I(x; yr)− I(x; ye)]
= I(x; ye|yr) (85)
= h(ye|yr)− h(ze|zr),
then note that this gap is zero since
h(ye|yr)
= log detπeΛb (86)
= log detπe(I+HeK¯PH
†
e − Φ¯†(I+HrK¯PH†r)Φ¯) (87)
= log detπe(I− Φ¯†Φ¯) (88)
= h(ze|zr),
where in (86)
Λb =
I+HeK¯PH
†
e
− (Φ¯† +HeK¯PH†r)(I+HrK¯PH†r)−1(Φ¯+HrK¯PH†e))
(89)
is the “backward” error covariance associated with the linear
MMSE estimate of ye from yr, and where to obtain each of
(87) and (88) we have used (22) of Property 1.
To obtain (84) when Hr = Θ¯He, we note that
R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) = I(x; yr|ye) (90)
= h(yr|ye)− h(zr|ze)
= h(yr − Θ¯ye)− h(zr − Φ¯ze) (91)
= h(zr − Θ¯ze)− h(zr − Φ¯ze) (92)
= 0, (93)
where (91) follows from the fact that Θ¯ in (17) is the
coefficient in the MMSE estimate of yr from ye, and Φ¯
is the coefficient in the MMSE estimate of zr from ze,
where (92) follows via the relation Hr = Θ¯He, so that
yr − Θ¯ye = zr − Θ¯ze, and where (93) follows from (23).
VI. CAPACITY ANALYSIS IN THE HIGH-SNR REGIME
We begin with a convenient upper bound that is used in
our converse argument, then exploit the GSVD in developing
the coding scheme for our achievability argument. Our high-
SNR capacity results follow, and separately consider the cases
where He does and does not have full column-rank.
Lemma 6: For all choices of Θ ∈ Cnr×nt and Φ ∈ Cnr×ne
such that ‖Φ‖2 ≤ 1, the secrecy capacity (35) of the channel
(1) is upper bounded by
C(P ) ≤ max
K¯P∈KP
R++(KP ,Θ,Φ), (94a)
where
R++(KP ,Θ,Φ)
, h(yr −Θye)− log detπe(I−ΦΦ†)
= log
det(HˆKP Hˆ
† + I+ΘΘ† −ΘΦ† −ΦΘ†)
det(I−ΦΦ†) ,
(94b)
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with
Hˆ = Hr −ΘHe. (94c)
Proof: First note that the objective function
R+(KP ,KΦ) in (11) can be expressed in the form
R+(KP ,KΦ) = I(x; yr|ye)
= h(yr|ye)− h(zr|ze)
= h(yr|ye)− log det πe(I−ΦΦ†)
= min
Θ
h(yr −Θye)− log detπe(I−ΦΦ†)
= min
Θ
R++(KP ,Θ,Φ), (95)
Hence,
R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) = min
KΦ
max
KP
R+(KP ,KΦ) (96)
= min
KΦ
max
KP
min
Θ
R++(KP ,Θ,Φ) (97)
≤ min
KΦ
min
Θ
max
KP
R++(KP ,Θ,Φ) (98)
= min
Φ:‖Φ‖2≤1
min
Θ
max
KP∈KP
R++(KP ,Θ,Φ),
(99)
where to obtain (96) we have used (35), where to obtain (97)
we have used (95), and where to obtain (98) we have used that
a minimax quantity upper bounds a corresponding maximin
quantity.
Finally, we further upper bound (99) by making arbitrary
choices for Θ and Φ, yielding (94).
A. GSVD Properties
The following properties of the GSVD in Definition 1 are
useful in our analysis.
First, the GSVD simultaneously diagonalizes the channels
in our model (1). In particular, applying (6) we obtain
y˜r(t) = Σ˜rx˜(t) + z˜r(t)
y˜e(t) = Σ˜ex˜(t) + z˜e(t),
(100)
where
Σ˜r =
[ k−p−s s p
s 0 Dr 0
p 0 0 I
]
Σ˜e =
[ k−p−s s p
k−p−s I 0 0
s 0 De 0
]
.
and
x˜(t) = Ω−1
[
Ψ
†
tx(t)
]
1:k
y˜r(t) =
[
Ψ†ryr(t)
]
nr−p−s+1:nr
y˜e(t) =
[
Ψ†eye(t)
]
1:k−p
z˜r(t) =
[
Ψ†rzr(t)
]
nr−p−s+1:nr
z˜e(t) =
[
Ψ†eze(t)
]
1:k−p.
The corresponding equivalent channel is as depicted in
Fig. 4.
PSfrag replacements
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Fig. 4. Equivalent parallel channel model obtained via GSVD.
Second, the GSVD yields a characterization of the null
space of He. In particular,
Null(He) = Sr ∪ Sn, (101)
where, expressingΨt as defined in (6) in terms of its columns
ψi, i = 1, . . . , nt, viz.,
Ψt =
[
ψ1 · · · ψnt
]
,
we have [cf. (2a), (2d)]
Sr = span(ψk−p+1, . . . ,ψk) (102a)
Sn = span(ψk+1, . . . ,ψnt). (102b)
We first verify (102). To establish (102b), it suffices to note
that
Hrψj = Heψj = 0, j = k + 1, . . . , nt,
which can be readily verified from (6).
To establish (102a), we show for all j ∈ {k− p+1, . . . , k}
thatHeψj = 0 and that the {Hrψj} are linearly independent.
It suffices to show that the last p columns of ΣrΩ−1 are
linearly independent and the last p columns of ΣeΩ−1 are
zero. To this end, note that since Ω−1 in (6) is a lower
triangular matrix, it can be expressed in the form
Ω−1 =


k−p−s s p
k−p−s Ω−11 0 0
s T21 Ω
−1
2 0
p T31 T32 Ω
−1
3

. (103)
By direct block left-multiplication of (103) with (7a) and (7b),
we have
ΣrΩ
−1 =


k−p−s s p
k−p−s 0 0 0
s DrT21 DrΩ
−1
2 0
p T31 T32 Ω
−1
3

 (104a)
ΣeΩ
−1 =


k−p−s s p
k−p−s Ω−11 0 0
s DeT21 DeΩ
−1
2 0
p 0 0 0

. (104b)
Since Ω3 is invertible (since Ω is nonsingular), the last p
columns of ΣrΩ−1 are linearly independent and the last p
columns of ΣeΩ−1 are zero, establishing (102a).
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To characterize Null(He), we use (102a) and (102b) with
(101) to obtain
Null(He) = span(ψk−p+1, . . . ,ψnt),
from which we obtain that
H♯e = ΨneΨ
†
ne, (105)
is the projection matrix onto Null(He), where
Ψne =
[
ψk−p+1 · · · ψnt
]
. (106)
In turn, using (106) and (104a) in (6a) we obtain
HrΨne = Ψr


[ p nt−k
nr−p 0 0
p Ω−13 0
]
 ,
whence
HrH
♯
eH
†
r = Ψr


[ nr−p p
nr−p 0 0
p 0 Ω−13 Ω
−†
3
]
Ψ
†
r .
(107)
Third, the GSVD can be more simply described when the
matrix He has a full column-rank. To see this, first note from
(3) and (5) that
k = nt and p = 0, (108)
respectively, and thus (6) specializes to
Ψ†rHrΨtΩ = Σr, Ψ
†
eHeΨtΩ = Σe, (109a)
with [cf. (7)]
Σr =
[ nt−s s
nr−s 0 0
s 0 Dr
]
, Σe =


nt−s s
nt−s I 0
s 0 De
ne−nt 0 0

,
(109b)
and Dr and De as in (8). Hence, it follows from (109) that
H‡e , ΨtΩ


[ nt−s s ne−nt
nt−s I 0 0
s 0 D−1e 0
]
Ψ
†
e (110)
satisfies H‡eHe = I and thus is the Moore-Penrose pseudo-
inverse of He. Finally, from (109) and (110) we obtain
HrH
‡
e = Ψr


[ nt−s s ne−nt
nr−s 0 0 0
s 0 DrD
−1
e 0
]
Ψ
†
e,
from which we see that the generalized singular values of (Hr,
He) in (9) are also the (ordinary) singular values of HrH‡e.
We now turn to our secrecy capacity analysis in the high-
SNR regime. There are two cases, which we consider sepa-
rately.
B. Case I: rank(He) = nt
In this case, we use that (108) holds and so the GSVD is
given by (109), and thus dim Sr,e = s, dim Se = nt − s, and
dim Sr = dim Sn = 0.
Achievability: In the equivalent parallel channel model of
Fig. 4, there are s subchannels that go to the intended receiver
(and also to the eavesdropper, with different gains), which
correspond to Sr,e. Of these s subchannels, we use only
the subset for which the gains to the intended receiver are
stronger than those to the eavesdropper, and with these our
communication scheme uses Gaussian wiretap codebooks.
In particular, we transmit
x = ΨtΩ
[
0nt−s
u
]
, u = [0, . . . , 0, uν, uν+1, . . . , us],
(111)
where ν is the smallest integer such that σj > 1, and where
the nonzero elements of u are i.i.d. CN(0, αP ) with α =
1/(ntσmax(Ω)) so that the transmitted power is at most P .
Using (111) and (109) in (1), the observations at the
intended receiver and eavesdropper, respectively, take the form
yr = Ψr
[
0nt−s
Dru
]
+ zr, ye = Ψe

 0nt−sDeu
0ne−nt

+ ze.
In turn, via (19), the (secrecy) rate achievable with this system
is
R = I(u; yr)− I(u; ye)
=
nt∑
j=ν
log
1 + αPr2j
1 + αPe2j
=
∑
j:σj>1
log σ2j − o(1)
as required.
Converse: It suffices to use Lemma 6 with the choices
Θ = HrH
‡
e, Φ = Ψr


[ nt−s s ne−nt
nr−s 0 0 0
s 0 Ξ 0
]
Ψ
†
e,
(112a)
where
Ξ = diag(ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξs), ξi = min
(
σi,
1
σi
)
, (112b)
and where H‡e is the pseudo-inverse defined in (110). With
these choices of parameters, (94c) evaluates to Hˆ = 0, so we
can ignore the maximization over KP in (94a). Simplifying
(94) for our choice of parameters yields
R++ ≤ log det(I+ (DrD
−1
e )
2 − 2DrD−1e Ξ)
det(I−Ξ2)
=
∑
j:σj>1
log σ2j , (113)
which establishes our result.
C. Case II: rank(He) < nt
In this case, we use the general form of the GSVD as given
by (6), so now dim Sr = p > 0 and dim Sr,e = s > 0.
12
Achievability: In the equivalent parallel channel model of
Fig. 4, there are p subchannels that go only to the intended
receiver, corresponding to Sr, and s subchannels that go to
both the intended receiver and eavesdropper (with different
gains), corresponding to Sr,e. Our communication scheme
uses both sets of subchannels independently with Gaussian
(wiretap) codebooks.
In particular, we transmit
x = Ψt


0k−p−s
Ω2u
v
0nt−k

 , (114)
where v and u are the length-p and length-s auxiliary random
vectors associated with communication over Sr and Sr,e,
respectively. The elements of v are i.i.d. CN(0, (P −√P )/p),
corresponding to allocating power P − √P to Sr. For Sr,e,
we use only the subset of channels for which the gains to the
intended receiver are stronger than those to the eavesdropper,
so u = [0, . . . , 0, uν, . . . , us]
T
, where ν is the smallest integer
such that σj > 1, and where the nonzero elements are i.i.d.
CN(0, α
√
P ), independent of v, with α = 1/(ntσmax(Ω2))
so that the power allocated to Sr,e is at most
√
P .
With x as in (114), the observations at the intended receiver
and eavesdropper, respectively, take the form
yr = Ψr

 0nr−p−sDru
T32Ω
−1
2 u+Ω
−1
3 v

+ zr, (115a)
ye = Ψe

 0k−p−sDeu
0ne+p−k

+ ze. (115b)
Via (19), the system (115) achieves (secrecy) rate
R = I(u, v; yr)− I(u, v; ye)
= I(u; yr)− I(u; ye) + I(v; yr|u), (116)
where (116) follows from the fact that v is independent of
(ye, u), as (115b) reflects.
Evaluating the terms in (116), we obtain
I(u; yr)− I(u; ye) =
nt∑
j=ν
log
1 + α
√
Pr2j
1 + α
√
Pe2j
=
∑
j:σj>1
log σ2j − o(1), (117)
and
I(v; yr|u) = log det
(
I+
P −√P
p
Ω−13 Ω
−†
3
)
= log det
(
I+
P
p
Ω−13 Ω
−†
3
)
− o(1) (118)
= log det
(
I+
P
p
HrH
♯
eH
†
r
)
− o(1), (119)
where (118) follows from the continuity of log det(·), and
where (119) follows from (107). Substituting (117) and (119)
into (116) yields our desired result.
Converse: To establish the converse, we use Lemma 6 with
the choices
Θ = Ψr




k−s−p s ne+p−k
nr−s−p 0 0 0
s 0 DrD
−1
e 0
p F31 F32 0




Ψ†e
(120)
and
Φ = Ψr




k−s−p s ne+p−k
nr−s−p 0 0 0
s 0 Ξ 0
p 0 0 0




Ψ†e, (121)
where Ξ is as defined in (112b), and where we choose
F32 = T32Ω2D
−1
e
F31 = (T31 − F32DeT21)Ω1
with T21, T31 and T32 as defined in (103), so that
Hr −ΘHe
= Ψr
([
ΣrΩ
−1 0nr×nt−k
]
−Ψ†rΘΨe
[
ΣeΩ
−1 0ne×nt−k
])
Ψ
†
t
= Ψr




k−p−s s p nt−k
nr−s−p 0 0 0 0
s 0 0 0 0
p 0 0 Ω−13 0




Ψ
†
t .
The upper bound expression (94) can now be simplified as
follows.
HˆKP Hˆ
† = (Hr −ΘHe)KP (Hr −ΘHe)†
= Ψr




nr−p−s s p
nr−p−s 0 0 0
s 0 0 0
p 0 0 Ω−13 QΩ
−†
3




Ψ†r ,
(122)
where Q is related to KP via
Ψ
†
tKPΨt =


k−p p nt−k
k−p
p Q
nt−k

,
and satisfies tr(Q) ≤ P . From (122), (121) and (120), we have
that the numerator in the right-hand side of (94b) simplifies
to (123) at the top of the next page.
In turn, using (123) and the Fischer inequality (which
generalizes Hadamard’s inequality) for positive semidefinite
matrices [30], we obtain
log det(I+ HˆΘHˆ† +ΘΘ† −ΘΦ† −ΦΘ†)
≤ log det(I+ (DrD−1e )2 − 2DrD−1e Ξ)
+ log det(I+ F31F
†
31 + F32F
†
32 +Ω
−1
3 QΩ
−†
3 ),
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HˆΘHˆ† + I+ΘΘ† −ΘΦ† −ΦΘ†
= Ψr




nr−s−p s p
nr−s−p I 0 0
s 0 I+ (DrD
−1
e )
2 − 2DrD−1e Ξ (DrD−1e − Ξ)F†32
p 0 F32(DrD
−1
e −Ξ) I+ F31F†31 + F32F†32 +Ω−13 QΩ−†3




Ψ†r (123)
which when used with (94) yields
C(P )
≤ log det(I+ (DrD
−1
e )
2 − 2DrD−1e Ξ)
det(I−Ξ2)
+ max
Q0:
tr(Q)≤P
log det(I+ F31F
†
31 + F32F
†
32 +Ω
−1
3 QΩ
−†
3 ),
the first term of which is identical to (113). Thus, it remains
only to establish that
max
Q0:
tr(Q)≤P
log det(I+ F31F
†
31 + F32F
†
32 +Ω
−1
3 QΩ
−†
3 )
≤ log det
(
I+
P
p
HrH
♯
eH
†
r
)
+ o(1), (124)
To obtain (124), let
γ = σmax(F31F
†
31 + F32F
†
32) (125)
denote the largest singular value of the matrix F31F†31 +
F32F
†
32. Since log det(·) is increasing on the cone of positive
semidefinite matrices, we have
max
Q0:
tr(Q)≤P
log det(I+ F31F
†
31 + F32F
†
32 +Ω
−1
3 QΩ
−†
3 )
≤ max
Q0:
tr(Q)≤P
log det((1 + γ)I+Ω−13 QΩ
−†
3 ) (126)
= log det
(
(1 + γ)I+
P
p
Ω−13 Ω
−†
3
)
+ o(1) (127)
= log det
(
I+
P
p
Ω−13 Ω
−†
3
)
+ o(1)
= log det
(
I+
P
p
HrH
♯
eH
†
r
)
+ o(1), (128)
where (126) follows from the fact that γI − F31F†31 −
F32F
†
32  0, and (127) follows from the fact that water-filling
provides a vanishingly small gain over flat power allocation
when the channel matrix has a full rank (see, e.g., [31]), and
(128) follows from (107).
D. Analysis of the Masked MIMO Transmission Scheme
To establish (29), we focus on the two terms in the argument
of (19), obtaining
I(u; yr) = log det(I+PtHrH
†
r) = log det(I+Pt∆
2), (129)
where we have used (27) to obtain the second equality, and
I(u; ye) = h(ye)− h(ye|u) (130)
with
h(ye) = log det(I+ PtHeH
†
e) (131)
and
h(ye|u) = log det(I+ PtHeVnV†nH†e)
= log det(I+ PtHe(I−VrV†r )H†e) (132)
= log det(I+ Pt(I−VrV†r )H†eHe), (133)
where to obtain (132) we have used that VrV†r +VnV†n = I
since
[
Vr Vn
]
is unitary, and where to obtain (133) we have
used that det(I+AB) = det(I +BA) for any A and B of
compatible dimensions.
In turn, substituting (131) and (133) into (130) we obtain,
with some algebra,
I(u; ye) = − log det(I− Pt(I+ PtH†eHe)−1(VrV†rH†eHe))
= − log det(I− PtV†rH†eHe(I+ PtH†eHe)−1Vr))
= − log det(V†r (I+ PtH†eHe)−1Vr). (134)
Finally, using (129) and (134) in the argument of (19), and
again using (27), we obtain [cf. (29)]
RSN(P )
= log det(I+ Pt∆
2) + log det(V†r (I+ PtH
†
eHe)
−1Vr)
= log det(PtI+∆
−2)
+ log det(U∆V†r (I+ PtH
†
eHe)
−1Vr∆U†)
= log det(PtI+∆
−2) + log det(Hr(I+ PtH†eHe)
−1H†r),
as required.
Finally, to establish the first equality in (30), we take the
limit Pt →∞ in (29). In particular, we have
RSN(P )
= log det(I+ P−1t ∆
−2)
+ log det(Hr(P
−1
t I+H
†
eHe)
−1H†r),
= O(P−1t ) + log det(Hr((H
†
eHe)
−1 +O(P−1t ))H
†
r)
(135)
= log det(Hr(H
†
eHe)
−1H†r)
+ log det(I+ (H†eHe)
−1/2O(P−1t )(H
†
eHe)
−†/2)
= log det(Hr(H
†
eHe)
−1H†r) +O(P
−1
t ), (136)
where to obtain (135) we have used that (ǫI+M)−1 =M−1+
O(ǫ) as ǫ→ 0 for any invertible M [32], and where we have
also used that log det(I +W) is continuous in the entries of
W.
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VII. MIMOME CHANNEL SCALING LAWS
We first verify Claim 1, then use it to establish Corollary 2.
Proof of Claim 1: Clearly, σmax(Hr,He) = ∞ when
[cf. (2a)] Sr 6= ∅. Otherwise, it is known (see, e.g., [33]) that
σmax(·) is the largest generalized singular value of (Hr,He)
as defined in (9).
To establish that the secrecy capacity is zero whenever
σmax(Hr,He) ≤ 1, it suffices to consider the high-SNR
secrecy capacity (24) when He has full column-rank, which
is clearly zero whenever σmax ≤ 1.
When σmax(Hr,He) > 1, there exists a vector v such that
‖Hrv‖ > ‖Hev‖. Then, choosing x = u ∼ CN(0, Pvv†) in
the argument of (19) yields a strictly positive rate R(P ), so
C(P ) ≥ R(P ) > 0 for all P > 0.
Combining Claim 1 and Fact 1 below, which is established
in [34, p. 642], yields Corollary 2.
Fact 1 ( [34], [35]): Suppose that Hr and He have i.i.d.
CN(0, 1) entries. Let nr, ne, nt →∞, while keeping nr/ne =
γ and nt/ne = β fixed. Then if β < 1,
σmax(Hr,He)
a.s.−→ γ


1 +
√
1− (1− β)
(
1− βγ
)
1− β


2
.
(137)
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper resolve several open questions regarding secure
transmission with multiple antennas. First, it establishes the
existence of a computable expression for the secrecy capac-
ity of the MIMOME channel. Second, it establishes that a
Gaussian input distribution optimizes the secrecy capacity
expression of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner for the MIMOME channel,
and thus that capacity is achieved by Gaussian wiretap codes.
Third, it establishes the optimum covariance structure for the
input, exploiting hidden convexity in the problem. Neverthe-
less, many questions remain that are worth exploring. As one
example, it remains to be determined whether such devel-
opments based on Sato’s bounding techniques be extended
beyond sum-power constraints, as the channel enhancement
based approach of [22] can.
In addition, our analysis highlights the useful role that the
GSVD plays both in calculating the capacity of the MIMOME
channel in the high-SNR regime, and in designing codes for
approaching this capacity. At the same time, we observed
that a simple, semi-blind masked MIMO scheme can be
arbtrarily far from capacity. However, for the special case
of the MISOME channel, [4] shows that the corresponding
masked beamforming scheme achieve rates close to capacity
at high SNR. Thus, it remains to be determined whether there
are better and/or more natural generalizations of the masked
beamforming scheme for the general MIMOME channel. This
warrants further investigation.
More generally, semi-blind schemes have the property that
they require only partial knowledge of the channel to the
eavesdropper. Much remains to be explored about what se-
crecy rates are achievable with such partial information. One
recent work in this area [5] illustrates the use of interference
alignment techniques for the compound extension of the multi-
antenna wiretap channel. Another recent work [36], studies
a constant-capacity compound wiretap channel model which
again captures the constraint that the transmitter only knows
the capacity (or an upper bound on the capacity) of the
channel to the eavesdropper. Further insights may arise from
considering other multiple eavesdropper scenarios with limited
or no collusion.
Finally, we characterize when an eaversdropper can prevent
secure communication, i.e., drive the secrecy capacity to zero.
Our scaling laws on antenna requirements and their optimal
distribution in limit of many antennas provide convenient
rules of thumb for system designers, as the results become
independent of the channel matrices in this limit. However,
it remains to quantify for what numbers of antennas these
asymptotic results become meaningful predictors of system
behavior. As such, this represents yet another useful direction
for further research.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF CLAIM 2
To begin,
I(x; yr|ye) = I(x;U†1yr,U†2yr|ye) (138)
= I(x; y˜r,U
†
1yr −V†1ye|ye)
= I(x; y˜r,Tx|ye), (139)
where (138) follows from the fact that [U1 U2] is unitary,
and where (139) follows from substituting for yr and ye from
(1), using (45), from and the fact that
U
†
1zr
a.s.
= V†1ze, (140)
since
cov(U†1zr,V
†
1ze) = E[U
†
1zrz
†
eV1] = U
†
1ΦV1 = I.
Now when I(x; yr|ye) <∞, we have from (139) that Tx = 0,
so I(x; yr|ye) = I(x; y˜r|ye), establishing (38).
Similarly,
I(x; ye|yr) = I(x;V†1ye,V†2ye|yr) (141)
= I(x; y˜e,V
†
1ye −U†1yr|yr)
= I(x; y˜e,Tx|yr), (142)
where we have used that
[
V1 V2
]
is unitary to obtain
(141) and (140) to obtain (142). When I(x; ye|yr) < ∞, we
have from (142) that Tx = 0, so I(x; ye|yr) = I(x; y˜e|yr),
establishing (41).
To verify the “only if” statement of the last part of the
claim, when I(x; yr|ye) =∞, we expand (139) via the chain
rule to obtain
I(x; yr|ye) = I(x; y˜r|ye) + I(x;Tx|y˜r, ye), (143)
15
and note that if Tx a.s.= 0 then the second term on the right-
hand side of (143) is zero. But the first term on the right-hand
side is finite, so cov(Tx) 6= 0, i.e., (44), holds.
To verify the “if” statement of the last part of the claim, we
use the chain rule to write
I(x; yr|ye) = I(x; y˜r,Tx|ye)
≥ I(x;Tx|ye)
≥ I(x;Tx)− I(x; ye), (144)
and note that the first term in (144) is infinite when cov(Tx) 6=
0, while the second term is finite.
APPENDIX II
OPTIMIZING R+(px,KΦ) OVER px WITH SINGULAR KΦ
To establish that I(x; yr|ye) with z ∼ CN(0,KΦ) for singu-
lar KΦ is maximized subject to the constraint cov(x) = KP
when x is Gaussian (hence, justifying (50) in this case), we
exploit Claim 2.
In particular, if for all px meeting the covariance constraint
we have I(x; yr|ye) < ∞, then we can use (38), expanding
and bounding I(x; y˜r|ye) in the same manner as (53)–(54),
with y˜r, z˜r, Λ˜ , U†2ΛU2 (the error covariance in the MMSE
estimate of y˜r from ye), and Φ˜ = U†2Φ [cf. (46)] replacing
yr, zr, Λ, and Φ, respectively. Specifically, we obtain that
I(x; y˜r|ye) = h(y˜r|ye)− h(z˜r|ze), (145)
is maximized when x is Gaussian.
If, instead, there exists a px satisfying the covariance con-
straint such that I(x; yr|ye) = ∞, then by the “only if” part
of the last statement of Claim 2 we have that (44) holds.
But by the “if” part of the same statement we know that
I(x; yr|ye) = ∞ for any px such that (44) holds, and in
particular we may choose px to be Gaussian.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF LEMMA 3 FOR SINGULAR K¯Φ
We begin with the following:
Claim 3: There exists a matrix H˜ such that the combined
channel matrix (4) can be expressed in the form
H =WH˜, (146)
where
K¯Φ =WΞ¯W
†, (147)
is the compact singular value decomposition of K¯Φ, i.e.,
where W has orthogonal columns (W†W = I), and the
diagonal matrix Ξ¯ has strictly positive diagonal entries.
Hence, the column space of H is a subspace of the column
space of W.
Proof: We establish our result by contradiction. Suppose
the claim were false. Then clearly I(x; yr, ye) =∞ when we
choose x = tυ where υ ∈ Null(W) and var t > 0, which
implies that
R+(KP , K¯Φ) = I(x; yr|ye) = I(x; yr, ye)− I(x; ye) =∞,
since I(x; ye) <∞ as cov(ze) = I is nonsingular. Hence,
R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) = max
KP∈KP
R+(KP , K¯Φ) =∞. (148)
But from (48) in Lemma 2 we know R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) < ∞,
which contradicts (148) and hence (146) must hold.
Using Claim 3, we see that in this case the original channel
(1) with cov(z) = KΦ can be replaced with the equivalent
combined channel
y˜ = H˜x+ z˜ (149)
where
y˜ ,W†
[
yr
ye
]
, z˜ ,W†z,
with cov(z) = Ξ. Hence, we can write
R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) = I(x; yr, ye)− I(x; ye),
where
I(x; yr, ye) = I(x; y˜) = log
det(Ξ+ H˜K¯P H˜
†)
det(Ξ)
(150)
and
I(x; ye) = log det(I+HeK¯PH
†
e). (151)
But from the saddle point property it follows that Ξ¯ can be
expressed as
Ξ¯ = argmin
{Ξ :WΞW†∈KΦ}
log
det(Ξ+ H˜K¯P H˜
†)
det(Ξ)
. (152)
In turn, the KKT conditions associated with the optimization
(152) are
Ξ¯−1 − (Ξ¯ + H˜K¯P H˜†)−1 =W†ΥW,
or, equivalently,
H˜K¯P H˜
† = Ξ¯W†ΥW(Ξ¯+ H˜K¯P H˜†), (153)
where the dual variable Υ is of the same block diagonal form
as in the nonsingular case, viz., (60). Multiplying the left- and
right-hand sides of (153) by W and W†, respectively, and
using (146) and (147) we obtain (63). Thus, the remainder of
the proof uses the arguments following (63) in the proof for
the nonsingular case to establish the desired result.
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Consider first the right-hand side of (71). Since h(yr−Θ¯ye)
is concave in KP ∈ KP and differentiable over KP , the KKT
conditions associated with the Lagrangian
LΘ(KP , λ,Ψ)
= h(yr − Θ¯ye) + tr(ΨKP )− λ(tr(KP )− P ) (154)
are both necessary and sufficient, i.e., KP is a solution to the
right-hand side of (71) if and only if there exists a λ ≥ 0 and
Ψ  0 such that
(Hr − Θ¯He)†Γ(KP , K¯P )−1(Hr − Θ¯He) +Ψ = λI,
tr(ΨKP ) = 0, and λ(tr(KP )− P ) = 0,
(155)
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where
Γ(KP , K¯P )
, cov(yr − Θ¯ye)
= I+ Θ¯Θ¯† − Θ¯Φ¯† − Φ¯Θ¯†
+ (Hr − Θ¯He)KP (Hr − Θ¯He)†. (156)
Considering next the left-hand side of (71), to which K¯P
is a solution, we have, from the associated KKT conditions,
that there exists λ′ ≥ 0 and Ψ′  0 such that
∇KP h(yr −Θ(KP )ye)
∣∣
KP=K¯P
+Ψ′ = λ′I
tr(Ψ′K¯P ) = 0, and λ′(tr(K¯P )− P ) = 0,
(157)
where Θ(KP ) is as defined in (18).
Thus, it remains to show that (155) and (157) are identical
when KP = K¯P . Focusing on the first equation in (157), we
have
∇KP h(yr −Θ(KP )ye)
∣∣
KP=K¯P
= ∇KP h(yr|ye)
∣∣
KP=K¯P
= ∇KP {h(yr, ye)− h(ye)}
∣∣
KP=K¯P
= H†(HK¯PH† + K¯Φ)−1H−H†e(I+HeK¯PH†e)−1He.
(158)
In turn, substituting for H and K¯Φ from (4) and (21), and
using (17), the first matrix inverse in (158) can be expressed
in the form
(HK¯PH
† + K¯Φ)−1
=
[
I+HrK¯PH
†
r Φ¯+HrK¯PH
†
e
Φ¯† +HrK¯PH†e I+HeK¯PH
†
e
]−1
=
[
Λ(KP )
−1 −Λ(KP )−1Θ¯
−Θ¯†Λ(KP )−1 (I+HeK¯PHe)−1+Θ¯†Λ(KP )−1Θ¯
]
,
(159)
where Λ(KP ) is as defined in (55), and where we have used
the matrix inversion lemma (see, e.g., [32]). Substituting (159)
into (158), and using the notation (55), yields, after some
simplification,
∇KP h(yr −Θ(KP )ye)
∣∣
KP=K¯P
= H†(K¯Φ +HK¯PH†)−1H−H†e(I+HeK¯PH†e)−1He
= (Hr − Θ¯He)†Λ¯−1(Hr − Θ¯He). (160)
Comparing (160) with the first equation in (155), we see
that it remains only to show that Γ(K¯P , K¯P ) = Λ¯, which
is verified as follows. First, Θ¯ye is the MMSE estimate of
yr from ye when KP = K¯P , and Γ(K¯P , K¯P ) = cov(yr −
Θ¯ye) = cov(yr|ye) is the error covariance associated with the
estimate. But by definition [cf. (55)] Λ¯ = cov(yr|ye) is also
the error covariance associated with the MMSE estimate when
KP = K¯P , so the conclusion follows.
APPENDIX V
PROOF OF LEMMA 4 FOR SINGULAR K¯Φ
First, note that via (47) with (48), we have that
R+(KP , K¯Φ) = I(x; yr|ye) < ∞ for all KP ∈ KP . Hence,
via (38) of Claim 2 we have
R+(KP , K¯Φ) = I(x; y˜r|ye), ∀KP ∈ KP , (161)
with the equivalent observations y˜r as given by (39) with (40).
Moreover, the noise cross-covariance Φ˜ = U†2Φ¯ [cf. (46)] in
the equivalent channel model has all its singular values strictly
less than unity, i.e., the associated KΦ˜ is nonsingular.
Thus, we can apply to this equivalent model the arguments
of the proof of Lemma 4 for the nonsingular case. In particular,
from (72) onwards we replace yr with y˜r, we replace Θ(KP )
and Θ¯ with, respectively, [cf. (18),(17)]
Θ˜(KP ) , (H˜rKPH
†
e + Φ˜)(I+HeKPH
†
e)
−1 = U†2Θ(KP )
(162)
and
Θ˘ , Θ˜(K¯P ) = U
†
2Θ¯, (163)
which is the coefficient in the MMSE estimate of y˜r from ye,
and we replace H¯eff and J¯ with, respectively, [cf. (77)]
H˜eff , J˜
−1/2(H˜r − Θ˘He)
and
J˜ , (I− Φ˜Φ˜†) + (Θ˘− Φ˜)(Θ˘− Φ˜)† = U†2J¯U2,
noting that J˜ ≻ 0 since KΦ˜ ≻ 0. With these changes, and
with the SVD
H˜eff = A˜Σ˜effB˜
†
replacing (78), the arguments apply and it follows that (H˜r−
Θ˘He)S has a full column rank. Since
(H˜r − Θ˘He)S = U†2(Hr − Θ¯He)S
it then follows that (Hr −ΘHe)S has a full column rank.
APPENDIX VI
PROOF OF LEMMA 5 FOR SINGULAR K¯Φ
Consider first the case in which Hr 6= Θ¯He, and note that
R+(K¯P , K¯Φ)−R−(K¯P ) = I(x; ye|yr) <∞,
where the equality is reproduced from (85), and where the
inequality follows from (48) and that R−(K¯P ) ≥ 0. Hence,
applying (41) from Claim 2, we have
R+(K¯P , K¯Φ)−R−(K¯P ) = I(x; y˜e|yr),
with the equivalent observations y˜e as given by (42) with (43).
Moreover, the noise cross-covariance
Φ˘ , E[zrz˜
†
e] = Φ¯V2 (164)
in the equivalent channel model has all its singular values
strictly less than unity, i.e., the associated K
Φ˘
is nonsingular.
Thus, we can apply to this equivalent model the correspond-
ing arguments of the proof of Lemma 5 for the nonsingular
case. In particular, from (85) onwards we replace ye and ze
with, respectively, y˜e and z˜e, we replace Λb with
Λ˜b =
I+ H˜eK¯P H˜
†
e
− (Φ˘† + H˜eK¯PH†r)(I+HrK¯PH†r)−1(Φ˘+HrK¯P H˜†e))
= V†2ΛbV2,
17
which is the backward error covariance associated with the
linear MMSE estimate of y˜e from yr, and we replace the use of
(22) in (87) and (88) with its form for the equivalent channel,
viz., for all full column-rank S¯ such that S¯S¯† = K¯P ,
Φ˘†HrS¯ = V
†
2Φ¯
†HrS¯ = V
†
2HeS¯ = H˜eS¯,
where to obtain the first equality we have used (164), where
to obtain the second equality we have used Property 1, and
where to obtain the third equality we have used (43).
Finally, consider the case in which Hr = Θ¯He. Since (48)
holds, so does (38) of Claim 2, and thus
R+(K¯P , K¯Φ) = I(x; y˜r|ye), (165)
with the equivalent observations y˜r as given by (39) with (40).
Thus, we can apply to this equivalent model the correspond-
ing arguments of the proof of Lemma 5 for the nonsingular
case. In particular (and as in Appendix V), from (90) onwards
(165) implies we replace yr and zr with, respectively, y˜r and
z˜r, we replace Φ¯ with [cf. (46)] Φ˜ = U†2Φ¯, the coefficient
in the MMSE estimate of z˜r from ze, and we replace Θ¯ with
[cf. (162),(163)]
Θ˘ = (H˜rK¯PH
†
e + Φ˜)(I+HeK¯PH
†
e)
−1 = U†2Θ¯, (166)
the coefficient in the MMSE estimate of y˜r from ye.
Note that in obtaining the counterpart of (92) we use that
y˜r − Θ˘ye = z˜r − Θ˘ze since
H˜r = U
†
2Hr = U
†
2Θ¯He = Θ˘He, (167)
where the first equality follows from (40), the second equality
follows from the assumption Hr = Θ¯He, and the third
equality from (166). Moreover, in obtaining the counterpart
of (93) we use that Θ˘ = Φ˜ when (167) holds.
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